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ESSAYS 
CONSTITUTIONAL QUALMS CONCERNING 
GOVERNMENTAL RESTRICTIONS ON TOBACCO 
PRODUCT ADVERTISING 
Barbara A. Noah-
I. INTRODUCTION 
DESPITE its undoubted public health importance, the decision by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to assert jurisdiction over cigarettes 
and other tobacco products raises significant constitutional questions. Indeed, one 
of the stumbling blocks to current efforts by Congress to codify the tobacco 
industry's proposed settlement turns on precisely this issue-namely, to what extent 
can the government restrict advertising of a lawful product without running afoul of 
First Amendment protections for commercial speech. The Clinton administration, 
which had heartily endorsed the FDA's restrictions on tobacco advertising, later 
warned Congress that a federal statute imposing more sweeping limits would present 
serious constitutional problems.! It is likely that the broader restrictions contem-
plated by Congress will pose more troublesome constitutional obstacles than those 
already imposed by the FDA. 
In August 1996, the FDA issued new rules designed to restrict the marketing of 
tobacco products.2 Among other things, the regulations establish a federal minimum 
age for the purchase of tobacco products, prohibit some vending machine sales, and 
mandate the inclusion of certain information in labeling.3 More importantly, the new 
regulations restrict the placement of outdoor advertising for tobacco products, 
* Adjunct Professor, University of Florida College of Law and College of Health Professions. 
B.A., 1987, Union College; J.D., 1990, Harvard Law School. 
I. See David E. Rosenbaum, White House Warns Congress Over Limiting Tobacco Ads, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 3,1998, atAl6; Jeffrey Taylor, Sen. McCain and White House Attempt to Hammer Out 
Tobacco-Deal Details, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1998, at A4 (describing Federal Trade Commission 
Chairman Robert Pitofsky's waming to the Senate Commerce Committee that advertising restrictions 
contained in the proposed settlement are unlikely to survive court challenges from tobacco companies). 
2. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco 
to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,616-18 (1996) (codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pI. 897 (1998». 
3. See id. at 44,396-97 (summarizing the new regulations). The FDA requires, for instance, that 
retailers verifY the age of purchasers by demanding picture identification, and it prohibits vending-
machine sales in certain locations, as well as the distribution offree samples of both cigarettes and 
smokeless tobacco products. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 897.14, 897.16 (1998). 
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including billboards and posters, within 1,000 feet of any playground or school.4 
They also limit all tobacco product advertising in publications with an under 
eighteen-year-old target audience to black text on a white background, sometimes 
characterized as a "tombstone" format. 5 Further, the regulations prohibit the 
marketing, distribution, sale, or gift of any items, other than the tobacco products 
themselves, bearing the product name, logo, selling message, or other "indicia of 
product identification," and they prevent tobacco product manufacturers, distributors, 
and retailers from sponsoring any sporting, musical, or other entertainment event 
using brand-names or other identifying information.6 
The industry immediately challenged the FDA regulations, filing a declaratory 
judgment action in federal court in North Carolina.7 In 1997, the district court 
granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment, agreeing that the agency could 
regulate tobacco products but deciding that the restrictions on advertising exceeded 
the FDA's statutory authority, thereby avoiding the need to rule on the industry's 
constitutional arguments.8 Judge Osteen certified his order for an interlocutory 
appeal, which is still pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit.9 
Although the broad public health goals underlying the regulations seem unassail-
able, there are serious doubts aboutthe FDA's assertion oflegal authority to regulate 
tobacco products in the manner that it has selected. 1O Moreover, even if the 
regulations comport with the terms of the FDA's enabling statute, some have argued 
that the agency exceeded First Amendment limitations in restricting advertising. II 
Although Congress is able to cure any statutory weaknesses in the FDA's position 
through legislation that explicitly delegates authority to the agency, Congress is no 
less subject to these constitutional obstacles in pursuing its legislative goals. In fact, 
given the wider variety of options available to it for reducing the use of tobacco 
products by minors, Congress may well face more searching constitutional scrutiny 
of its legislation than the FDA regulations would. 
This essay will evaluate the constitutionality of a representative series of 
congressional proposals to limit tobacco advertising. Federal legislation codifying 
4. See 21 C.F.R. § 897.30(b) (1998). 
5. See id. § 897.32(a). This restriction applies when minors account for more than either 15% 
of a pUblication's readership or two million readers of a publication. 
6. See id. § 897.34. The regulations would, however, permit such events to be sponsored in the 
name of the corporation that manufactures the products, provided that the corporate name had been 
registered before January 1, 1995. See id. § 897.34(c). 
7. See Barnaby J. Feder, Tobacco Curbs Face Legal Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1996, at A8; 
Claudia MacLachlan, Tobacco's Road is Smooth: FDA Regs Face Legal Fight, NAT'L L.l., Sept. 9, 
1996, at B 1, B2. 
8. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 958 F. Supp. 1060, 1086 (M.D.N.C. 1997). 
9. See Bob Van Voris, Circuit Overdue on Tobacco Case, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 16, 1998, at A6; 
Judge's Death Puts Ruling in Question on FDA and Tobacco, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1998, at A6. 
10. See, e.g., Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Nicotine Withdrawal: Assessing the FDA's Effort 
to Regulate Tobacco Products, 48 ALA. L. REv. 1, 15-37 (1996); Lars Noah, Regulating Cigarettes: 
(Non}sense and Sensibility, 22 S. ILL. U. LJ. 677 (1998). 
11. In fact, the FDA recently lost a similar battle over its restrictions on health claims for dietary 
supplements. See Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (invalidating restrictions on 
First Amendment grounds). 
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the tobacco settlement might include restrictions on outdoor advertising, a prohibition 
on the use of cartoon images, permitting only tombstone format for advertisements 
in publications that target a youth audience, a prohibition on the sale or gift of 
promotional items bearing tobacco product names or logos, a ban on industry 
sponsorship of sporting and other cultural events, and restrictions on Internet 
promotions. 11 In seeking to prevent tobacco companies from encouraging illegal 
tobacco use by minors, the FDA's advertising restrictions, and any comparable 
legislation enacted by Congress, will limit a broad category of commercial speech. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD FOR PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
In 1971, at the tobacco industry'S prompting, Congress prohibited all broadcast 
advertising of cigarettes. 13 In a decision pre-dating any judicial recognition of special 
protection for commercial speech, a federal court upheld this legislation. 14 In 
concluding that the statute did not violate the First Amendment rights of broadcast-
ers, the district court noted that, because "nothing in the Act ... precludes a 
broadcast licensee from airing its own point of view on any aspect of the cigarette 
smoking question, it is clear that petitioners' speech is not at issue."ls The court also 
held that Congress had a rational basis for prohibiting the advertising because 
substantial evidence demonstrated that radio and television reached a large audience 
of young people. 16 
Subsequently, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission,17 the Supreme Court developed a four-part test to determine whether 
a restriction on commercial speech exceeds First Amendment limitations: 
For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful 
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest 
is substantial. Ifboth inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the 
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not 
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. IS 
12. See, e.g., S. 1415, 105th Congo (Nov. 7, 1997); S. 1491, 105th Congo (Nov. 8, 1997); 
S. 1530, 105th Congo (Nov. 13, 1997). Many of the proposals in Congress closely mirror the FDA's 
regulations with regard to restrictions on tobacco product advertising. See, e.g., Gregory D. Bassuk, 
Note, Advertising Rights and Industry Fights: A Constitutional AnalysiS o/Tobacco Advertising 
Restrictions in a Federal Legislative Settlement o/Tobacco Industry Litigation, 85 GEO. LJ. 715, 717-
19 (1997) (describing the contours of early proposed settlement plans). 
13. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 6, 84 Stat. 87 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994». 
14. See Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), affd mem., 405 U.S. 
1000 (1972). The Supreme Court first recognized special constitutional protection for commercial 
speech in 1976. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748 (1976). 
15. See Capital Broad. Co., 333 F. Supp. at 584. 
16. See id. at 585-86. 
17. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
18. [d. at 566. The four-part analysis in Central Hudson was reaffirmed in the Court's decision 
to overturn a prohibition on the disclosure of alcohol content in the labeling of beer. See Rubin v. 
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995). See also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 
1495, 1508-10 (1996) (plurality) (striking down state prohibition against alcohol price advertising as 
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In other words, assuming that the speech does not relate to some unlawful activity 
and is not inherently misleading, the government may restrict commercial speech 
only to achieve a substantial interest, and then only to the extent necessary. The 
Supreme Court continues to grapple with the application of these standards in a 
variety of commercial speech contexts, and, as explained below, recent decisions 
suggest that the Court is moving generally in the direction of more protection for this 
kind of speech. 
Although it is difficult to predict precisely what restrictions might be included in 
whatever legislation codifies the tobacco industry settlement, some advertising and 
promotional limitations that were part of the original FDA regulations appear 
repeatedly in a number of proposed tobacco settlement bills. The following sections 
will examine how each of these restrictions would fare under the constitutional 
standard. 
A. Government Interest in Controlling Tobacco Advertising 
The Central Hudson test first asks whether the speech in question is false or relates 
to some illegal activity; if so, it is not protected by the First Amendment and may be 
banned altogether.19 The government has not suggested that existing labeling and 
advertising of tobacco products is false, and tobacco companies have refrained from 
expressly urging underage use. Nonetheless, FDA officials and members of 
Congress take the position that certain types of tobacco advertising encourage 
unlawful use of these products by minors and are inherently misleading. Curiously, 
in defending the constitutionality of its proposed restrictions on tobacco advertising, 
the FDA did not initially argue that such advertising promotes an unlawful activity 
or is inherently misleading.20 In the preamble accompanying the finai regulations, 
the agency suggested, but did not rely on, this argument.21 Some tobacco company 
unconstitutional under the Central Hudson test, and suggesting an even stricter test for scrutinizing 
such outright prohibitions on commercial speech); id. at 1522 (O'Connor, l., concurring in judgment) 
("Because Rhode Island's regulation fails even the less stringent standard set out in Central Hudson, 
nothing here requires adoption of a new analysis for the evaluation of commercial speech regulation. "). 
19. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. See also United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 
418,426-30 (1993) (upholding a federal statute restricting broadcast advertising of lotteries if unlawful 
within a state); Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495-96 
(1982) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to an ordinance regulating the sale of drug paraphernalia 
within a certain proximity of any literature encouraging the use of illegal drugs); Pittsburgh Press Co. 
v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) ("We have no doubt that a 
newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or 
soliciting prostitutes."). 
20. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco 
Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,354 (1995) ("The Central 
Hudson analysis begins with the second prong."). 
21. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco 
Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396,44,470-72 (1996). Cf Vincent 
Blasi & Henry P. Monaghan, The First Amendment and Cigarette Advertising, 256 lAMA 502, 506 
(1986) (arguing that cigarette advertising is deceptive and misleading); Kenneth L. Polin, Argument 
Jor the Ban oJTobacco Advertising: A First AmendmentAnalysis, 17 HOFSlRA L. REv. 99, 113 (1988) 
(arguing that tobacco product advertising is inherently misleading and, thus, can be banned without 
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documents suggest that these companies deliberately targeted minors in past 
advertising campaigns. Nevertheless, because any codification of the settlement will 
proscribe certain types of future advertising, the past motives of some tobacco 
manufacturers, however reprehensible, should be irrelevant under the first prong of 
the Central Hudson analysis. 
For purposes of deciding the constitutionality of any prospective restrictions, the 
issue is simply whether the permitted future advertisements of a certain type promote 
an unlawful activity or are inherently misleading. Unless these advertisements 
explicitly urge underage smoking (or provide coupons or other incentives that have 
the same effect), they do not directly promote an unlawful activity. To the extent that 
they might do so indirectly, the advertising restrictions must satisfy the remaining 
prongs of the commercial speech test. If it were otherwise, then a variety of 
promotional campaigns (such as advertisements for sports cars) which indirectly 
encourage unlawful activities (such as violating posted speed limits) would receive 
absolutely no constitutional protection from governmental restrictions. 
Assuming that the category of commercial speech is neither false nor misleading, 
the second prong of the Central Hudson test asks whether the government has 
asserted a substantial interest in imposing the restriction.22 The FDA simply noted 
that it has a significant interest in protecting the public health by reducing smoking 
among youngsters, proceeding to the third prong of the analysis.23 The government 
undoubtedly has a legitimate interest in reducing the number of minors who begin 
smoking, both to protect the health of those individuals and to reduce the cost to 
society in caring for them when they suffer from tobacco-related illnesses.24 It is 
doubtful that anyone, even the tobacco industry, can successfully rebut this c1aim?5 
As the investigation into the past advertising practices of the tobacco industry 
continues, evidence that the industry targeted teens as potential smokers continues 
violating constitutional protections for commercial speech). But see Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 
F.2d 738, 743 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (arguing, in the context ofliquor advertisements, that "[n]early 
all advertising associates the promoted product with a positive or alluring lifestyle or famous or 
beautiful people"). 
22. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. See also Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism 
Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986) (holding that the legislature's interest in promoting the 
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens by reducing their demand for gambling is substantial and 
justifies the regulation of gambling advertising). 
23. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,472-73. 
24. See, e.g., id. at 44,399; Jane E. Brody, Study Finds Stunted Lungs in Young Smokers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 26, 1996, at B I O. To the extent that the FDA asserts a collateral goal of reducing 
consumption by adults exposed to the same types of advertising, the proposed restrictions may be 
harder to justifY under the remaining prongs of the Central Hudson test. See 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 
S. Ct. at 1508 (plurality) ("The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations 
that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good."). See 
also id. at 1516 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (concluding that such an interest is "per se 
illegitimate"). 
25. In fact, one American cigarette manufacturer has admitted to several important facts under-
lying the government's asserted interest in reducing adolescent tobacco use. The Liggett Group, Inc., 
has conceded that cigarette smoking is addictive and causes cancer, and that cigarette makers have 
targeted minors with their marketing efforts. See John M. Broder, Cigarette Maker Concedes Smoking 
Can Cause Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,1997, at AI. 
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to accumulate.26 Thus, the real focus of the debate over the constitutionality of 
restrictions on the advertising of tobacco products will revolve around the nexus and 
narrow tailoring requirements of the Central Hudson test. 
B. The Nexus Between Means and Ends 
Assuming that a substantial government interest supports the tobacco advertising 
restrictions, the next question is whether the regulations directly advance the asserted 
interests.27 Although the FDA took comfort in the Supreme Court's willingness in 
one recent case to accept anecdotal evidence in support of a restriction on commercial 
speech,28 the Court generally has been reluctant to allow interference with protected 
speech on the basis of such a tenuous evidentiary foundation,z9 In Rubin v. Coors 
Brewing Co. ,30 for example, the Court emphasized that the government shoulders the 
burden of showing that a restriction advances its asserted interests "in a direct and 
material way.,,31 
In the course of its rulemaking proceeding, the FDA gathered a wealth of evidence 
regarding the association between promotion and the use of cigarettes and smokeless 
tobacco products by minors.32 The agency also collected evidence, including reports 
26. Evidence continues to mount that the tobacco industry purposefully targeted teenagers with 
advertising, and that this advertising increased rates of teen smoking. See Charles King III, et aI., 
Adolescent Exposure to Cigarette Advertising in Magazines, 279 JAMA 516 (1998) (concluding that 
the cigarene brands that are most popular with adolescent smokers are more likely than adult brands 
to advertise in magazines with a high percentage of young readers); Jeffrey Taylor, Tobacco Ads' Role 
in Teen Smoking Meets Criticism, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 1998, at B I O. 
27. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 
(1980) (explaining that "the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest" and must "be 
designed carefully to achieve the State's goal"). 
28. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,474 (1996). See also Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., SIS U.S. 618, 
627-28 (1995) ('The anecdotal record mustered by the Bar is noteworthy for its breadth and detail. ... 
In any event, we do not read our case law to require that empirical data come to us accompanied by 
a surfeit of background information."). The Court was sharply divided on this and other aspects of the 
case. See id. at 641 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Our cases require something more than a few pages 
of self-serving and unsupported statements by the State to demonstrate that a regulation directly and 
materially advances the elimination of a real harm when the State seeks to suppress truthful and non-
decepti ve speech."). 
29. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569 (noting that the link between the advertising prohibition 
and the utility's rate structure was tenuous, even if there was an "immediate connection" between the 
advertising at issue and the demand for electricity: "[T]he Commission's laudable concern over the 
equity and efficiency of appellant's rates does not provide a constitutionally adequate reason for 
restricting protected speech."). See also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1509-
II (1996) (requiring the State to show that a ban on liquor price advertising "will significantly advance 
the State's interest in promoting temperance" and requiring "findings of fact" and "evidentiary 
support" that the State's restrictions would be effective); Edenfield V. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 
(1993) (explaining that the government's burden is not satisfied by "mere speculation or conjecture"). 
30. 514 U.S. 476 (1995). 
31. See id. at 487; 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1509-10 (plurality) (finding inadequate 
evidence to support the state's claim that its ban on alcohol price advertising would promote 
temperance). 
32. See Regulations Restricting the Sale & Distribution of Cigarettes & Smokeless Tobacco 
Products to Protect Children & Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,488-89 (1996) (summarizing the 
evidence); id. at 44,466-69, 44,475-88, 44,494-95 (detailing the evidence). 
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of success in other countries, to demonstrate that advertising restrictions reduce 
consumption.33 Thus, it concluded that the restrictions directly advanced the 
government's legitimate interest in protecting the public health.J4 Similarly, 
Congress continues to gather information about the relationship between advertising 
and decisions by teenagers to try smoking; thus, the evidence supporting the 
government's assertion that restrictions on advertising will directly advance the 
governmental interest continues to groW.35 Although critics of studies concerning the 
relationship between advertising and teen smoking question the validity of these 
conclusions,J6 courts typically accord substantial deference to congressional 
factfinding.37 
Overall, the proposed restrictions on advertising seem likely to reduce demand for 
cigarettes among the adolescent population to some extent,38 though forced reduc-
tions in the billions of dollars spent annually by the tobacco industry for advertising 
could lead to greater price competition, which might actually increase purchasing by 
minors, unless counteracted with steep taxes on tobacco products?9 Viewed 
individually, the likely effectiveness of the different restrictions seems more variable. 
The various pending bills suggest a range of potential restrictions on outdoor 
advertising. At one extreme, the FDA's regulation restricts only advertising on 
billboards by prohibiting their placement within 1,000 feet of schools and 
playgrounds.40 At the other extreme, one recent bill proposes to prohibit all forms 
33. See id. at 44,489-93. 
34. Id. at 44,495. 
35. One study conducted by researchers at the University of California at San Diego's Cancer 
Center concluded that 34% of teenage experimentation with cigarette smoking is attributable to 
advertising and promotional activities. See John P. Pierce et aI., Tobacco Industry Promotion of 
Cigarettes and Adolescent Smoking, 279 lAMA 511 (1998) (providing evidence that tobacco 
advertising has a causal connection with teenagers' decisions to begin smoking). 
36. See Howard K. Jeruchimowitz, Note, Tobacco Advertisements and Commercial Speech 
BalanCing: A Potential Cancer to Truthful, Nonmisleading Advertisements of Lawful Products, 82 
CORNELL L. REv. 432, 454-55 (1997) (describing the evidentiary debate and concluding that the 
government may have difficulty proving a direct link benveen advertising and tobacco consumption). 
37. See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 428 (1993). This special deference 
accorded to congressional factfinding has parallels in the Court's previous Equal Protection 
jurisprudence. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980) (Burger, CJ., concurring 
plurality) (noting that the Court is "bound to approach [its) task with appropriate deference to the 
Congress, a co-equal branch"). Cf Richmond v. 1.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1989) 
(showing less deference in reviewing a municipal ordinance). 
38. See Erica Sweicker, Note, Joe Camel: Will "Old Joe" Survive?, 36 WM. & MARYL. REv. 
1519, 1522-25 (1995); Timothy Noah, Study Says Minors Respond More 10 Cigarette Ads Than Do 
Adults, WALL ST. 1., Apr. 4, 1996, at 88 (summarizing a new study finding that advertising influenced 
adolescent smokers' preferences among cigarette brands). Cf 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 
116 S. Ct. 1495, 1509-10 (1996) (plurality) (discounting the value of evidence concerning the 
purported link between price advertising and the level of alcohol consumption). 
39. See Daniel Helberg, Note, Butt Out: An Analysis of the FDA's Proposed Restrictions on 
Cigarette Advertising Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1219, 1260 
(1996). The FDA dismissed this possibility with little discussion. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,511 (1996). 
It conceded elsewhere that the industry would save money, but speculated that the unspent advertising 
budgets would be redirected as increased dividends for shareholders or investments in other product 
lines. See id. at 44,570. 
40. See 21 C.F.R. § 897.30(b) (1998). 
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of outdoor advertising, including billboards, posters, and placards, in all locations.41 
Recent constitutional challenges to billboard restrictions may offer useful guidance 
about this aspect of the proposed restrictions on outdoor tobacco advertising. In 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,42 the Supreme Court held that state statutes prohib-
iting the advertising of liquor prices other than at the point of sale were unconstitu-
tional.43 In the wake of this decision, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit44 distinguished 44 Liquormart, emphasizing that the ordinance did not 
amount to a complete prohibition and also was designed to protect underage 
consumers rather than adults.45 By contrast, the Rhode Island law denied all adult 
consumers any information about alcoholic beverage prices. In distinguishing 44 
Liquormart, the Fourth Circuit's opinion emphasized Baltimore's goal of protecting 
children from advertisements that encourage the use of products that are harmful and 
illegal to sell to children. Based on the court's increasingly speech-protective 
position as described in 44 Liquormart, it appears that only those restrictions on 
outdoor advertising that directly and materially advance the government's goal of 
protecting children will survive constitutional scrutiny.46 To the extent that some of 
the congressional proposals restrict advertising that children ordinarily do not see, 
these restrictions do not have a direct effect on the number of minors who smoke. 
These broader prohibitions on outdoor advertising are far less likely to satisfy the 
Central Hudson test's third prong. The narrower restrictions, sim i lar to those in the 
FDA's regulations, should survive a constitutional challenge if the government can 
provide the necessary evidence of a direct connection between such advertising and 
the incidence of teenage tobacco use. 
The tombstone format restriction for advertisements in publications with a large 
teenage readership also seems likely to have a direct and material effect on adolescent 
demand for tobacco products. The FDA regulation, if codified in the legislation, 
would restrict tobacco advertisements in publications with a youth readership of 
fifteen percent or more to this black and white, text-only forrnat. 47 As with the 
41. See. e.g., S. 1415, 105th Congo § 101(a)(I) (Nov. 7,1997). This would prohibit "any fonn 
of outdoor tobacco product advertising, including billboards, posters, or placards." 
42. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996) (plurality). 
43. See id. at 1515. 
44. See Penn Adver. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 862 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Md. 1994), 
affd, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996), modified, 101 
F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Mayor of 
Baltimore, 855 F. Supp. 811 (D. Md. 1994), affd sub nom. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 
1305 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 1821 (1996), modified, 10 I F .3d 325 (4th Cir. 
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997). 
45. See Anheuser-Busch, 101 F.3d at 328-29 (noting that children "deserve special solicitude in 
the First Amendment balance because they lack the ability to assess and analyze fully the infonnation 
presented through commercial media"). See also Donald W. Gamer & Richard 1. Whitney, Protecting 
Children from Joe Camel and His Friends: A New First Amendment and Federal Preemption Analysis 
of Tobacco Billboard Regulation, 46 EMORY L.1. 479,551 (1997) (arguing that government action to 
control commercial speech that is harmful to children is "entitled to significantly greater deference by 
the courts than when [the government] act[s] to control commercial speech in general"). 
46. See 44 Liquormart. Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1509. 
47. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco 
to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,513 (1996). Other proposals would ban 
tobacco product advertising altogether in publications with this substantial youth readership. See 
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billboard restrictions discussed above, as long as the government can offer some 
substantial evidence that this restriction will reduce underage tobacco use in a direct 
and material way, it will probably survive scrutiny under the third prong of the 
Central Hudson test. Such evidence might include studies confirming that the text-
only advertisements generate significantly less interest among readers than do full-
color advertisements with drawings or photographs.48 However, to the extent that 
Congress is considering a tombstone format restriction for print advertising in all 
publications without regard to their targeted readership, such limitations seem 
vulnerable. 
Similarly, the ban on promotional items and programs would appear to relate 
directly to adolescent demand for tobacco products. Many of these programs are 
designed to increase the rate of tobacco products purchasing by requiring the 
consumer to collect coupons or proofs of purchase which they can then redeem for 
merchandise bearing a tobacco product brand name or logo. To the extent that the 
government can proffer evidence that such programs appeal particularly to adolescent 
consumers of tobacco products, a ban on these programs would likely advance the 
governmental interests in a direct and material way. 
In contrast, restrictions on brand name sponsorship of sports events and other 
entertainment events seems less likely to produce a direct effect on teen demand for 
tobacco products, and the government may have more difficulty in proving a causal 
connection between attendance at industry-sponsored events and smoking. If, in fact, 
the evidentiary link between event sponsorship and adolescent tobacco use remains 
anecdotal, then this restriction may fail to satisfy the third prong of the Central 
Hudson test. 
Finally, some bills to codify the tobacco settlement have included a proposed ban 
on Internet advertising of these products.49 In Reno v. ACLU,so the Supreme Court 
considered the First Amendment's application to the Internet. In striking down a 
recent statute as an overbroad attempt to restrict minors' access to obscene materials 
on the Internet, the Court emphasized this medium's unique qualities.51 Noting that 
the Internet was a communications medium with no history of government 
regulation,52 the Court went on to criticize the vagueness of the statutory language.53 
A ban on Internet advertising oftobacco products would certainly be more explicit 
than the vague prohibition against permitting underage access to obscene and 
indecent materials, and would face weaker constitutional scrutiny as commercial 
speech, but such a limitation suffers from other flaws. It may not be technologically 
Children's Health Preservation and Tobacco Advertising Compliance Act, S. 1755, 105th Congo 
{I 998). The same bill would ban the use of human images and cartoon figures in all tobacco 
advertising, no matter the target audience. See id. 
48. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,466-68, 44,508-13 (1996); 61 Fed. Reg. 49,475-82 (\996) (describing 
available evidence); 60 Fed. Reg. 41,333-34 (1995); 60 Fed. Reg. 41,335-56 (\995). 
49. See, e.g., Children's Health Preservation and Tobacco Advertising Compliance Act, S. 1755, 
105th Congo § 2 (1998) (conditioning a tax exemption on compliance with a prohibition of advertise-
ments of tobacco products on the Internet "unless such advertisement[s) [are) inaccessible in or from 
the United States"). 
50. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). 
51. See id. at 2341-50. 
52. See id. at 2342. 
53. See id. at 2344. 
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feasible to limit access from the United States to advertisements posted on Internet 
sites that are maintained by American tobacco companies but that originate in other 
countries. Once companies receive warning of the consequences, however, they will 
likely comply, so the restriction will have an extraterritorial effect. The government 
may have some difficulty demonstrating that such a ban would directly advance its 
asserted interest in reducing adolescent tobacco product use as well, because minors 
would still be able to access foreign tobacco advertisements without difficulty. 
Because Congress could assert control only over those Internet sites worldwide that 
could carry U.S. tobacco company advertisements, the effectiveness of such a ban 
remains highly questionable. 
C. The Availability of Less Speech-Restrictive Alternatives 
1. The Over-Inclusiveness of the ProposedAdvertising Regulations 
The proposals seem most vulnerable under the final prong of the Central Hudson 
test, 54 which requires that a restriction be no more extensive than necessary to achieve 
the government's goa1.55 The FDA's preamble includes a detailed explanation to 
justify each of its advertising limitations.56 Nevertheless, some of the restrictions fail 
to differentiate between advertisements directed at minors, in whose welfare the 
government asserts a substantial interest, and advertisements directed at adults. 57 The 
simple response to this concern is that, to the extent that a number of the proposals 
fail to draw a bright line between advertising targeted to teenagers and material 
intended for adults, such a line is both impractical and unnecessary. 
54. See David Cole, Muzzling Joe Camel, LEGAL TIMES, May 6, 1996, at 22; Helberg, supra note 
39, at 1258-66. Cf Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Liberating Commercial Speech: Product Labeling 
Controls and the First Amendment, 47 FLA. L. REv. 63, 99-104 {I 995) (evaluating the FDA's food 
labeling restrictions on health claims). 
55. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993) 
("While we have rejected the 'Ieast-restrictive-means' test for judging restrictions on commercial 
speech, so too have we rejected mere rational basis review .... [I]fthere are numerous and obvious 
less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant 
consideration in determining whether the 'fit' between ends and means is reasonable."); In re R.MJ., 
455 U.S. 191,203 (1982); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980). 
56. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,500-37, 44,610. The FDA repeatedly explained that adults will 
continue to have access to informational advertising through the text-only format (and to unrestricted 
advertising in adult publications and establishments) but that children will no longer be exposed to 
appealing colors and imagery. For an argument that such restrictions violate the Constitution, see 
Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REv. 589, 625-30, 638 
(1996). According to Professor Redish, only the restrictions on tobacco advertising in the vicinity of 
schools or playgrounds pass First Amendment muster. See id. at 608. 
57. Cf Sable Communications V. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989) (invalidating restriction on 
phone-sex services that "has the invalid effect oflimiting the content of adult telephone conversations 
to that which is suitable for children to hear"); Penn Adver. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 
63 F.3d 1318, 1325-26 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to a city's prohibition 
on all cigarette billboard advertising justified as a way to reduce underage smoking), vacated, 116 S. 
Ct. 2575 (1996), modified, 101 F.3d 325 (4th Cir., 1996), cert. denied, 1I7 S. Ct. 1569 (l997). 
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Undoubtedly, some of the advertising restrictions would have an impact on 
information that is of use to adult smokers-critics of the tombstone format limitation 
point out that the larger majority of adult readers of affected publications will be 
deprived of truthful, non-misleading information about a product that they may 
lawfully purchase and enjoy.58 The same over-inclusiveness argument might apply 
to any billboard or Internet advertising restrictions because they will affect all 
tobacco users, not just minors. One less restrictive alternative would be to ban 
tobacco advertising from all Internet sites, but to allow tobacco companies to 
maintain corporate home pages where adult smokers can deliberately seek out 
"important infonnation" about tobacco products. However, because the proposed 
ban on Internet advertising, unlike the speech restriction in Reno,59 targets only a 
specific type of advertising rather than a whole category of speech, it may survive 
constitutional scrutiny in its proposed form. The proposed ban on sponsorship of all 
sporting and entertainment events, such as musical and cultural productions, appears 
to be overbroad as well because it will affect adults who attend these events, as well 
as minors. The problem is that these overlaps are unavoidable. If the government 
can pursue its objectives using more precise restrictions, then the broader rules are 
unconstitutional; if not, then the government can constitutionally restrict the 
commercial speech. 
2. Taxation of Tobacco Products 
The FDA originally had argued, among other things, that the government's greater 
power to ban tobacco products includes the lesser power to regulate extensively the 
advertising of these products,60 and that it has "greater leeway" to regulate "speech 
with regard to socially harmful activities."61 In its latest commercial speech decision, 
however, the Supreme Court roundly rejected these arguments.62 Recognizing the 
weakness of its initial defense, the agency included in the final preamble a more 
sophisticated response to these constitutional objections, including an explanation 
58. See Redish, supra note 56, at 627 (explaining that limitations on the use of color and pictures 
"significantly interfere with the communicator's ability to reach the intended audience" and concluding 
that "a speaker's ability to choose the manner of expression should not be viewed as uniquely tied to 
the speaker's developmental interest, but to the listener's free speech rights as well"). 
59. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). 
60. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco 
Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,355 (1995) (citing Posadas de 
Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986». 
61. 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,355 (1995). 
62. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1511-13 (1996) (plurality) ("The 
reasoning in Posadas does support the State's argument, but, on reflection, we are now persuaded that 
Posadas erroneously performed the First Amendment analysis," including its Significant deference to 
a state legislature's choice of means, its "greater-inc1udes-the-Iesser" reasoning, and its supposed 
"vice" exception.); jd. at 1513 ("As the entire Court apparently now agrees, the statements in the 
Posadas opinion on which Rhode Island relies are no longer persuasive."); id. at 1522 (O'Connor, 1., 
concurring in judgment) ("The closer look that we have required since Posadas comports better with 
the purpose of the analysis set out in Central Hudson . ... "). See also Rubin v. Coors, 514 U.S. 476, 
482 n.2 (1995) (rejecting government's suggestion that it has "broader latitude to regulate speech that 
promotes socially harmful activities"); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 
763 (1988). 
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that it lacked the power to tax the tobacco industry in order to discourage 
consumption through price increases.63 
The major difficulty with surmounting the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test 
lies in the fact that, unlike the FDA, Congress has the authority to implement 
approaches to reduce cigarette sales that would constitute less restrictive alternatives 
to the advertising restrictions described above. Legislation to increase taxes on 
tobacco products, or even more stringent restrictions on access, represent the most 
obvious non-speech related approaches.64 In fact, lawmakers have proposed major 
price increases on the sale of cigarettes, which might be effective in reducing sales 
(especially among youngsters) without infringing on constitutionally protected 
speech.65 Moreover, the revenues generated by such taxes might be used to fund 
educational campaigns aimed at adolescents. The existence of these alternatives may 
or may not translate into a successful challenge to advertising restrictions under the 
fourth prong of the Central Hudson test. And, in defending any general legislative 
action to limit tobacco advertising, Congress, unlike the FDA, cannot protest that its 
options were limited. In order to satisfy the fourth prong's narrow tailoring require-
ment, the government would have to offer evidence that the taxation approach (and 
other non-speech alternatives such as monitoring age restriction enforcement at retail, 
banning vending machines and mail order sales, and counter-advertising) will fail to 
accomplish the goal of reducing teenage tobacco product use, or at least, will fail to 
accomplish this goal as effectively.66 It may be sufficient, however, for the 
63. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,496-500 (\996). 
64. See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1510 ("[H]igher alcohol prices can be maintained either by 
direct regulation or by increased taxation."); id. at 1522 (O'Connor, 1., concurring in judgment). Other 
non-speech alternatives include government-sponsored education programs, and medical programs to 
treat tobacco addiction. 
65. See John Schmeltzer & Michael Arndt, Under Siege in Cigarette Wars, Tobacco Titans 
Counterattack, CHI. TRm., Mar. 25, 1994, at I. Commentators on the proposed tax increase note that 
because minors have less disposable income than adults, there will be a greater reduction in overall 
tobacco consumption by minors. See David Bourne et aI., The Effect of Raising State and Federal 
Tobacco Tax, 38 J. F AM. !'RAe. 300 (\ 994). See also 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,324 (J 995) ("Young people, 
who generally have little disposable income, can be particularly sensitive to the price of cigarettes and 
may choose not to smoke as the price increases."). Cf 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,453 (\996) ("The agency 
cannot act on these comments as it lacks the authority to levy taxes or mandate prices."). 
66. Educational campaigns sometimes are mentioned as a possible alternative to a restriction on 
commercial speech, but courts assume a government-sponsored campaign and, in any event, can only 
speculate about its likely effectiveness. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1510 ("Even 
educational campaigns focused on the problems of ... drinking might prove to be more effective."). 
See also id. at 1522 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Noah & Noah, supra notc 10, at 35 & 
nn.148-49 (describing the success of such programs in California and Massachusetts). 
Some critics believe that the approach could, however, prove to be counterproductive. See Carlo 
DiClemente, Will the Regulations Work?, HEALTH L. NEWS, Sept. 1995, at 6 (arguing that "societal 
efforts must avoid increasing attention to cigarettes, even if in a negative manner, or creating 
restrictions that would increase black market demand. Efforts to curb smoking ... can have a reverse 
effect by creating a rebellious, recalcitrant cohort of smokers."). See also Robert S. Adler & R. David 
Pittle, Cajolery or Command: Are Education Campaigns an Adequate Substitute for Regulation?, I 
YALE 1. ON REG. 159, 162-64 (1984); Lawrence O. Gostin & Allan M. Brant, Criteria for Evaluating 
a Ban on the Advertisement of Cigarettes: BalanCing Public Health Benefits with Constitutional 
Burdens, 269 lAMA 904,906 (1993); Alan Schwartz, Views of Addiction and the Duty to Warn, 75 
VA. L. REv. 509, 556-57 (1989). 
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government to demonstrate that the advertising limits would marginally enhance the 
effectiveness of the other provisions. The courts have not explicitly considered this 
application of the fourth prong of Central Hudson, and this interpretation would 
effectively render the fourth prong redundant with the third prong, except in rare 
cases where non-speech alternatives are completely effective. 
3. The Value of Tobacco Product Advertising 
The Constitution protects commercial speech in order to ensure the free-flow of 
information so that adults can make rational, informed decisions about consumer 
products;67 but such a rationale does not apply in the context of access by minors to 
information about a dangerous product that they have no legal right to purchase or 
use. Tobacco product advertising is simply less valuable than political speech, and, 
given the costs associated with such advertising, there is little reason to accord it the 
same protection that political speech, or even other commercial speech, deserves. 
Although one may quibble with the wisdom of some of the advertising restrictions, 
a reviewing court would probably sustain their constitutionality on the strength ofthe 
evidentiary record amassed by the FDA and Congress, at least in the case of the 
restrictions on billboard placement, tombstone format in certain publications, and the 
ban on promotional items. The proposed prohibitions on industry sponsorship of 
sporting, cultural and other entertainment events appear somewhat less defensible 
under the third prong of the test. And, as stated above, any ban on Internet 
advertising, in light of the latest Supreme Court decisions, may be somewhat difficult 
to defend, though ultimately such a ban would probably survive constitutional 
scrutiny as well. 
A few legal scholars argue forcefully that the constitutional protection of 
commercial speech remains inadequate. For instance, Professor Martin Redish 
remains dissatisfied with the constitutional protection afforded commercial speech, 
even after the Court's recent decision in 44 Liquormart. Professor Redish argues that 
there is little or no reason to treat commercial speech any differently than other 
protected speech when evaluating First Amendment c1aims.68 In particular, he 
decries the "ulterior result orientation" in the debate over the constitutionality of 
restricting tobacco product advertising.69 Professor Redish argues that, to the extent 
that the application of First Amendment protection for commercial speech really 
reflects a judgment by those with political power about the societal value of the 
particular speech, the constitutional guarantee "degenerate[s] into nothing more than 
a manipUlative tool ofthose who exercise [such] power.,,70 In the case oftobacco 
advertising, the strong congressional and public support for the goals of the 
advertising restrictions might translate into the recognition of particularly weak 
constitutional protection for the commercial speech in question. However, at least 
67. See 44 Liquonnart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1508 (1996) (plurality) (noting that 
commercial speech bans "not only hinder consumer choice, but also impede public debate over central 
issues of public policy"). 
68. See Martin H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise 0/ the Commercial Speech 
Distinction: The Case o/the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. Ky. L. REv. 553, 578 (1997). 
69. See id. at 556-57. 
70. See id. at 557. 
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in the short term, recent commercial speech decisions suggestthat the Supreme Court 
is not yet willing to take the final step, advocated by Professor Redish, of making 
commercial speech protections identical to those for political speech. 
D. The Alternative of Imposing "Voluntary" Advertising Restrictions 
Numerous members of Congress have expressed concern that, unless the tobacco 
industry voluntarily agrees to accept advertising restrictions, any codification of the 
settlement may be tied up in litigation for years.71 This position makes little sense. 
First, it presupposes that a constitutional challenge to the restrictions under 
commercial speech doctrine will succeed. As suggested above, this is far from 
apparent. Second, it assumes that implementation of other portions of the settlement 
package will necessarily be delayed for the duration of any constitutional challenge 
to the advertising restrictions. It may be possible to draft the legislation in such a 
way that the different provisions are severable. Finally, and most importantly, the 
position taken by Senator Hatch and others presumes that Congress can 
constitutionally negotiate in a "voluntary" settlement with the tobacco industry that 
which it may not constitutionally be able to require.72 If any of the legislation were 
thOUght to be unconstitutional under commercial speech standards, Congress may not 
be able to avoid that difficulty through the back-door. 
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine will complicate any attempts at a 
"voluntary" agreement to restrict tobacco product advertising. The doctrine focuses 
on those situations where the government has impermissibly coerced someone into 
relinquishing a constitutional right. 73 In applying the doctrine, the U.S. Supreme 
Court frequently uses a nexus analysis to determine whether the right-sacrificing 
condition extracted by the government is "germane" to the benefit conferred on the 
recipient.74 The Court has explained that "the government may not require a person 
71. See David E. Rosenbaum, Senators Jockey on Tobacco Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. II, 
1998, at A20 (describing Senator Orrin Hatch's assertion that because advertising is protected by the 
First Amendment, Congress will have to offer liability limitations to tobacco companies in exchange 
for the industry's voluntary agreement to accept advertising restrictions, in order to avoid expensive 
and lengthy litigation). The most recent bill to receive significant support in Congress concedes much 
less, in terms of liability, to the tobacco industry. The McCain tobacco bill, approved by the Senate 
Commerce Committee on April I, 1998, implicitly assumes that the industry's cooperation is needed 
to avert litigation over some of its potentially unconstitutional provisions. However, it contains none 
of the original measures from the June 20,1997 deal designed to protect the industry against liability; 
instead it provides only for a $6.5 billion yearly cap on industrywide liability. See Bob Van Voris, 
Tobacco Bill May Undo Deal, NAT'L L. J., Apr. 13, 1998, at AI, A15. 
72. One presidential adviser has asserted that voluntary commitments to limit advertising "are 
of course constitutional," but that Congress could not force the industry into accepting those limits as 
a condition of protection from liability in tobacco-related lawsuits. See Rosenbaum, supra note I, at 
AI6 (summarizing comments made by Bruce N. Reed, President Clinton's chief adviser on domestic 
policy). Without using such leverage, it is difficult to imagine what would prompt the tobacco industry 
to agree voluntarily to restrictions that would significantly limit advertising. 
73. See Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow a/Congressional Delegations 
0/ Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REv. 873, 914-15 (explaining that the doctrine may apply in situations 
where "even without coercion, individuals . . . face seriously constrained choices and ... the 
government's offer may encourage persons to waive their rights without valid consent"). 
74. See. e.g., United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 471-77 (1995); 
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to give up a constitutional right ... in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred 
by the government where the [condition] sought has little or no relationship to the 
property."75 Commentators point out that the Supreme Court's "wildly inconsistent" 
application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine makes it difficult to predict 
whether the Court will apply it in any given situation.76 
In the context of the tobacco settlement, the industry would be giving up its free 
speech rights in exchange for statutory limitations on its tort liability in pending (and 
perhaps also future) lawsuits. One bill proposes that the tobacco industry would have 
to waive its right to pursue any judicial challenges to the legislation or else lose the 
liability protections.77 If the direct imposition of the advertising restrictions would 
pose constitutional problems, then an agreement by tobacco companies to accept the 
restrictions does not avoid the possibility of judicial scrutiny. If no logical relation-
ship exists between the industry's First Amendment concessions and the 
government's conferral of liability protection against certain categories of lawsuits, 
then the "voluntary" agreement to limit advertising would be no more constitutional 
than if Congress directly imposed it by statute. Arguably, of course, a connection 
exists in this case-the tobacco industry might agree to give up some First 
Amendment rights in exchange for limitations on tort liability for tobacco-related 
illnesses that resulted from the now-restricted advertising practices. As a practical 
matter, moreover, such an approach would minimize the risk of judicial challenges 
by the advertising industry because the tobacco manufacturers, rather than the 
government, will have chosen to restrict promotional campaigns. Nonetheless, the 
manufacturers may file a lawsuit arguing that their waiver of commercial speech 
protections represented a non-germane, and therefore unconstitutional, condition 
imposed on a benefit offered by Congress in an attempt to purchase the industry's 
First Amendment rights. 
A voluntary approach also poses some practical problems. One can imagine a 
company with a limited market share deciding to reject the proffered immunity, 
refusing to adhere to the ''voluntary'' advertising restrictions, and instead viewing 
defection as a short-term strategy to consolidate a larger market share by continuing 
to advertise aggressively. It remains to be seen whether this governmental offer of 
Dolan v. City ofTigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). 
75. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. 
76. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional 
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits o/Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 5, 10-11 (1988) (complaining 
that the doctrine "roams about constitutional law like Banquo's ghost, invoked in some cases, but not 
in others"); Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of 
Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 989, 995-96 (1995); Louis Michael Seidman, 
Reflections on Context and the Constitution, 73 MINN. L. REv. 73, 75 (1988). See also Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1413 (1989) (canvassing several competing 
theories based on notions of coercion, corruption, and commodification, and offering instead a 
"systemic" theory calling for strict scrutiny of rights-pressuring conditions on government benefits 
because they skew the distribution of power between and among the government and governed). 
"[U]nconstitutional conditions doctrine responds to a constant fear that government will tend to use 
the strategic manipulation of gratuitous benefits to aggrandize public power." [d. at 1493. 
77. See Rosenbaum, supra note 71, at A20 (describing Senator Orrin Hatch's proposed 
limitations on tobacco industry tort liability in exchange for industry compliance with speech-
restrictive tobacco advertising prOvisions); S. 1415, 105th Congo (Nov. 7, 1997). 
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limited tort immunity, if it materializes, will constitute a sufficient enticement to all 
of the tobacco companies. One small company that has already broken ranks with 
the industry78 would probably agree to limit its advertising practices according to a 
settlement agreement in exchange for immunity from liability in certain categories 
oflawsuits. Although all of the companies already have agreed to certain voluntary 
limitations in settling litigation in a few state lawsuits,79 it is less clear whether all of 
the companies will find the proposed federal deal sufficiently appealing. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Unlike the FDA, Congress has the authority to enact a variety of provisions, such 
as increased prices, that will advance its goal of reducing underage tobacco product 
use. Some of these approaches would allow the federal government to achieve its 
goals without restricting commercial speech by the tobacco industry. Ultimately, 
Congress may conclude that it is wiser to sacrifice the effectiveness of restrictions on 
tobacco advertising in order to avoid litigation, and decide instead to pursue less 
effective non-speech approaches to reducing tobacco use by minors. However, the 
enormous congressional and public support for the important goals of this legislation, 
combined with the still flexible constitutional protection for commercial speech, 
suggest that the advertising restrictions would, in the end, withstand constitutional 
scrutiny and may, to some extent, reduce adolescent tobacco use. 
78. See Barry Meier, Liggett & Myers to Assist Tobacco Industry Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 
1998, at A22 (describing the company's agreement to cooperate with the government in its 
investigation into "possible wrongdoing by the tobacco industry"). 
79. See generally Symposium Issue, 22 S. ILL. L.J. (Spring 1998) (discussing pending and settled 
state lawsuits). 
